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Abstract—My Health Record system is the Australian Govern-
ment’s digital health record system that holds My Health Record.
My Health Record is a secure online health record containing
consumers’ health information. The system aims to provide
health care professionals with access to key health information,
e.g. listing medicines, allergies and key diagnoses; radiology and
pathology test results. The system (previously named Personally
Controlled Electronic Health Record) enables consumers to decide
how to share information with any of their health care providers
who are registered and connected to the system. The My
Health Record system operates under the Australian legislative
framework My Health Records Act 2012. The Act establishes,
inter alia, a privacy framework specifying which entities can
collect, use and disclose certain information in the system and
the penalties that can be imposed on improper collection, use and
disclosure of this information. This paper presents the formal
specification (from the legislation) and verification of the My
Health Record regarding how consumers can control who access
the information, and how the system adheres to such access.
We rely on the correct-by-construction Event-B method to prove
control and access properties of the system.
Index Terms—Health records, Health records privacy, Formal
specification and verification, Event-B
I. INTRODUCTION
The interest in introducing electronic personal health record
systems has emerged as an important area of research in the
medical and health informatics domain. These systems are
indeed complex to understand, implement and use as they have
many different components interacting to each other while
managing sensitive information of their users. An electronic
personal health record system is a digital version of a patient’s
health information. The system makes patient’s information
available instantly and securely to authorised users. Many
countries have implemented their own system: the National
Health Service implemented the Summary Care Record [1]
in UK, ELGA [2] (elektronische Gesundheitsakte) in Austria,
the National Electronic Health Record [3] in Singapore, My
Health Records [4] in Australia, among others.
In Australia, the first national electronic health record
system was launched in 2012 [5], initially named Personally
Controlled Electronic Health Record and later changed (in
2016) to My Health Record. The system is supported by
a legislative framework. The objectives of the system were
defined in the My Health Records Act 2012 (Cth)1 by the
Australian government as follows:
1Retrieved from https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2019C00337
“ to enable the establishment and operation of a voluntary
national system for the provision of access to health informa-
tion relating to recipients of healthcare, to:
1) Help overcome the fragmentation of health information;
and
2) Improve the availability and quality of health information;
and
3) Reduce the occurrence of adverse medical events and the
duplication of treatment; and
4) Improve the coordination and quality of healthcare pro-
vided to healthcare recipients by different healthcare
providers.”
The system is different from others implemented in other
countries as its emphasis is to empower Australians through
being able to personally control their health information: what
is displayed and how others (e.g. GPs) can access such infor-
mation. Consistent with this view, the government chose an
opt-in model: users must register to use the system. However,
the opt-in model did not achieve the expected number of users.
It is reported that only 803 people registered in the first week,
4500 people in the first month, and as low as 6000 in the
first two months all over Australia; while the targeted user
number is 500000 within the first year of the operation of
the system [5]. In 2019, the government adopted an opt-out
model: all Australians were automatically registered and the
decision of non-participating has to be specially requested by
the individuals. This model has impacted the number of users
of the system. My Health Record system (as in April, 2020)
has 22.7M users, over 15.6M of them have data, around 1.95B
health documents have been uploaded, and more than 90% of
pharmacies, hospitals and service providers are registered [6].
Despite letting users to personally control their health
information, they have no confidence on the system in terms of
their privacy and who can actually access the information and
how [7]–[9]. Privacy is addressed by having users choosing
who can or cannot access their records. Access measures are
addressed by having laws and regulation in place. However,
there is not a clear way to ensure this to users. In this paper,
we present a formal specification of the My Health Record
system based on the legislation that defines it. We focused on
the control and access properties of the health information.
We also present the formal verification of such properties
and the validation of the system (using animation of the
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system and code generation). We believe that the use of formal
methodologies to ensure the access and control of My Health
Record sensitive information will give users the confidence
to properly use the system. Furthermore, this work opens a
promising avenue for using a more formal approach to check
(verify) legislation.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces
the formal methodologies and the mathematical notation used.
Section III describes the My Health Record system and its
requirements within the access and control framework. The
formalisation of the system is introduced in Section IV. The
section shows the formal specification and verification of the
system in Event-B [10]. And the validation step, animation
in ProB [11], and code generation, with EventB2Java [12].
Section V compares our approach with similar works. Finally,
Section VI is devoted for conclusions and future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Event-B
Event-B [10] is a formal method technique to describe and
analyse the behaviour of reactive systems. Event-B language
is based on predicate logic and set theory. It includes a
full-fledged battery of operations over sets and relations for
modelling discrete software systems. Event-B models are
composed of machines and contexts. Three basic relationships
are used to structure an Event-B model, namely, a machine
sees a context or can refine another machine, and a context can
extend another context. Machines contain the dynamic parts
of a model (i.e. variables, invariants, events), and contexts the
static part of a model (i.e carrier sets, constants). Events (after
keyword events in Figure 1) are composed of two parts, the
guard (the WHERE keyword in Figure 1) and the actions (the
THEN keyword in Figure 1). Actions can only be executed
if the guard holds. Each action determines how a machine
variable evolves by modelling a variable assignment in Event-
B (the := symbol). In Event-B, systems are typically modelled
via a sequence of refinements. First, an abstract machine is
developed and verified to satisfy whatever correctness and
safety properties are desired. Refinement machines are used
to add more detail to the abstract machine until the model is
sufficiently concrete for hand or automated translation to code.
Refinement proof obligations are discharged to ensure that
each refinement is a faithful model of the previous machine,
so that all machines satisfy the correctness properties of the
original.
Figure 1 is an excerpt of the My Health Record system
in Event-B. Machine abs mch sees (keyword sees) context
ctx abs . The context is omitted in the figure; it defines two
carrier sets (new data type) MY HEALTH RECORD mod-
elling all possible record spaces in the system, and PEOPLE
modelling all possible people of the system. Machine abs mch
defines three variables: my health report DB , the set of all
record spaces currently active in the system; consumer , the set
of all users of the system; and MyHR , mapping consumers
to their record space. MyHR is defined as a one-to-one
function (). The possible values of variables is shaped
machine abs mch sees ctx abs
variables my health report DB consumer MyHR
invariants
inv1 my health report DB⊆MY HEALTH RECORD
inv2 consumer⊆ PEOPLE
inv3 MyHR ∈ consumer my health report DB
events
opt out ,
ANY c
WHERE
grd1 c ∈ consumer
THEN
act1 consumer := consumer \ {c}
act2 my health report DB := my health report DB \ {MyHR(c)}
act3 MyHR := MyHR \ {c7→MyHR(c)}
END
END
Fig. 1: Excerpt of My Health Record system model in Event-
B.
by the invariant (after keyword invariants). Event opt out
models the action of a consumer c (after keyword ANY) to
opt out the system. Consumers can opt out at any time, as
long as they are part of the system (grd1). If the event is
triggered, the consumer is removed from the set of active users
(act1), as well as the consumer’s My Health Record (act2).
To maintain consistency with the invariant (inv3), the mapping
c7→MyHR(c) is removed from MyHR (act3). In Event-B,
actions are executed in parallel.
Rodin [13] is an open source Eclipse based integrated
development environment (IDE) for Event-B model devel-
opment. The Rodin is a core set of plug-ins for project
management, formal development, syntactic analysis, proof
assistance and proof-based verification. Moreover, it comes
with additional plugins to provide different functionalities and
features: ProB [11] translates Event-B models to B to model
finding, checking, deadlock and test case generation. It can
also be used to animate the model; EventB2Java [12] is a code
generator plugin that soundly generates JML-annotated Java
code from Event-B. EB2ALL [14] is a plug-in that includes the
EB2C, EB2C++, EB2J, and EB2C# plug-ins, each translating
Event-B machines to the indicated language.
B. Mathematical notations
The following is the mathematical notation underlying our
model. It is drawn from the Event-B notation [10].
1) Sets: Let S and T be sets and E and F expressions:
• ∅ denotes the empty set.
• S ∪ T is the set union.
• S ∩ T is the set intersection.
• S\T = {x | x ∈ S ∧ x 6∈ T} is the set difference.
• P(S) = {x | x ⊆ S}, the power set of S.
• E 7→ F is an ordered pair.
• S × T = {x 7→ y | x ∈ S ∧ y ∈ T} is the Cartesian
product.
2) Set predicates: Let S, T and U be sets:
• S ⊆ T denotes subset.
• partition(U, S, T ), S and T partition the set U , i.e. U =
S ∪ T ∧ S ∩ T = ∅.
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3) Relations: A relation is a set of ordered pairs; a many
to many mapping. Let S and T be sets and r and p relations:
• S↔ T = P(S × T ) is a relation.
• dom(r) = {x | ∃y · x 7→ y ∈ r} denotes the domain of
r.
• ran(r) = {y | ∃x · x 7→ y ∈ r} denotes the range of r.
• r; p = {x 7→ y | ∃z · x 7→ z ∈ r ∧ z 7→ y ∈ p} denotes
forward composition.
• S C r = {x 7→ y | x 7→ y ∈ r ∧ x ∈ S} denotes domain
restriction.
• r B T = {x 7→ y | x 7→ y ∈ r ∧ y ∈ T} denotes range
restriction.
• S B id = {x 7→ x | x ∈ S} denotes the identity.
• r−1 = {y 7→ x | x 7→ y ∈ r} is the inverse of relation r.
• r[S] = {y | ∃x · x ∈ S ∧ x 7→ y ∈ r} denotes relation
image.
4) Functions: A function is a relation with the restriction
that each element of the domain is related to a unique element
in the range; a many to one mapping. Let S and T be sets:
• S 7→ T = {r | r ∈ S ↔ T ∧ r−1; r ⊆ T B id} denotes
partial function.
• S→ T = {f | f ∈ S 7→ T ∧ dom(f) = S} denotes total
function.
• ST = {f | f ∈ S→T ∧f−1 ∈ T 7→S∧ran(f) = T}
denotes a bijective function; a one to one relation.
III. MY HEALTH RECORD SYSTEM
My Health Record system (herein MyHR) is an online cen-
tralised folder summary documents relating to the healthcare
of consumers. The system is similar to a Dropbox folder2
where the health information of a consumer is summarised
and can be accessed by different entities. The system aims to:
improve consumers’ care, safety and medical communication.
The lack of interoperability between hospitals and GPs is a
common source of medical error. MyHR allows for health in-
formation to be in one place, which aims to avoid this problem;
reduce the need to recite medical history. This reduces the
need for consumers to explain (which could be wrong) their
medical history; improve continuity of care between providers.
Consumers often visit different service providers for the same
condition. Having all health information consolidated in one
single place might help GPs to continue a treatment.
The folder is mainly controlled by consumers, so, in prin-
ciple, they can decide who can access which information.
The system enables consumers to access their health infor-
mation, add records (e.g. medication the consumer is taking),
set privacy controls, hide or remove information and access
another consumer’s MyHR (see nominated and authorised rep-
resentatives below). This section introduces the system based
on the Australian Acts My Health Records Act 2012 (Cth)3
and My Health Records Rule 2016 (Cth)4. The emphasis is
on the control and access properties of the system. Figures
2www.dropbox.com
3Retrieved from https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2019C00337
4Retrieved from https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2016C00607
2 and 3 show the schematic representation of control and
access of the different elements of the system. Figure 2 shows
what can be controlled by the elements of the system. The
‘Type of’ arrow also indicates inheritance of permissions. For
instance, a Restricted service provider is a type of General
service provider. It can add restricted records as well as general
ones. Figure 3 shows the access permissions to information.
Similarly, the ‘Type of’ arrow also indicates inheritance of
access. For instance, a Full access nominated representative
can access both general and restricted records.
Fig. 2: Control scheme in MyHR
A. Definitions
Some of the definitions used throughout the paper are:
My Health Record: the record of healthcare information
that is created and maintained by the system operator in
relation to the consumer;
My Health Record system (MyHR): a system for the col-
lection, use and disclosure of healthcare information, in
accordance to the consumer’s wishes;
Record: information or an opinion about the health of a con-
sumer. For instance, information about allergies, blood
test results, medical conditions, prescriptions.
System operator: a person in charge of establishing and
maintaining the MyHR;
Consumer: a person who has received, receives, or may
receive healthcare. (Defined as healthcare recipient in the
Act.);
Service provider: a registered entity that provides health-
care. (Defined as healthcare provider organisation or
individual healthcare provider in the Act.);
Nominated Representative: a person appointed by the con-
sumer (in agreement with the system operator) to access
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the consumer’s MyHR, in accordance to the consumer’s
wishes;
Authorised Representative: a person (in agreement with the
system operator) who has parental responsibility for a
consumer aged under 14 or for a consumer who is not
capable of making decisions for themselves.
B. The system
Consumers, once part of the system, are entitled to own only
one MyHR; ownership cannot be shared. Initially, the MyHR is
empty, no health information has been uploaded. Over time,
the MyHR is populated with consumer’s health information (i.e.
records), e.g. after a consumer visits their GPs, pharmacists or
hospitals. A records is associated to only one MyHR and has
only one owner: the owner of the MyHR where the record sits.
Records can be marked as one of the following types:
• ‘general’: records that can be accessed by anyone with
access permission to the MyHR. Records are marked
‘general’ by default;
• ‘restricted’: restricted records that need a special permis-
sion to be accessed;
• ‘hidden’: no one (including its owner) has access to these
records. Consumers can recover them in agreement with
the system operator.
Consumers can access their own records marked as ‘general’
and ‘restricted’. A key feature of the system is that con-
sumers can add and delete records, and control which service
providers and nominated representatives access what records.
Fig. 3: Access scheme to records in MyHR
Service providers can be in charge of consumers’ healthcare.
This gives them access to consumers’ MyHR. As part of the
control given to consumers, they can list their service providers
as General, Restricted or Revoked. Thus, consumers restrict
the access of service providers to specific records: General
service providers can access any record marked as ‘general’.
They can also upload records to the MyHR. Records will be
marked as ‘general’; Restricted service providers can access
any record marked as ‘general’ or ‘restricted’. (General access
permissions are included in the Restricted access permissions.)
In addition, Restricted service providers can upload records to
the MyHR. Records will be marked as ‘restricted’; Revoked
service providers have access to no records.
Consumers can also be nominated or authorised represen-
tatives of someone else’s MyHR. A nominated representative
can access or help manage consumers’ MyHR. They might
be a family member, close friend or carer. Consumers can
add or delete nominated representatives to their MyHR; they
cannot nominate themselves. Similar to service providers,
consumers can restrict the access of records to nominated rep-
resentatives by assigning them to specific lists. A nominated
representative can be in one of the following lists: General,
Restricted or Full access. General nominated representatives
can access all records of the MyHR marked as ‘general’;
Restricted nominated representatives can access all records of
the MyHR marked as ‘general’ and ‘restricted’. General access
permissions are included in the Restricted access permissions;
Full access nominated representatives are special Restricted
representatives (thus, they have the same access permissions)
with the additional capacity of uploading records to the MyHR.
Records will be marked as either ‘general’ or ‘restricted’.
Consumers can also set an access code to their MyHR
on their restricted records. If they want a service provider
or nominated representative with General access to access
restricted records, the consumer can provide the code5.
An authorised representative is a person who manages the
MyHR of someone who cannot manage their own. Hence,
consumers cannot be authorised representatives of their own
MyHR. An authorised representative might manage the record
on behalf of a child, or an adult who lacks capacity. They
are empowered under Australian law to do anything that the
consumer would be able to do. The system operator is in
charge of delegating authorised representatives to a consumer.
Authorised representatives have full access and control over a
MyHR as if they were the owners. Once a MyHR has at least
one authorised representative, the owner of such MyHR loses
all control over it. Table I summarises the properties of the
system concerning access and control of the MyHR.
Access to the information can be bypassed in emergency
situations. The My Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) defines
where it may be permissible for entities to bypass the access
controls. The Act defines an emergency access function,
commonly referred as ‘break glass’ function. Such a function
can be used when there is a serious threat to the individual’s
life, health or safety and their consent cannot be obtained;
or there are reasonable grounds to believe that access to the
5The model in section IV does not consider this option as providing
a General service provider or nominated representative with a code is
semantically equivalent as granting them Restricted access
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Property ID Description
p1 (control) Consumers can add, delete and restrict their own records.
p2 (access) Consumers can access their own records marked as ‘general’ and ‘restricted’.
p3 (access) Service providers have access to their consumers’ MyHR.
p4 (control) Consumers can restrict access of service providers by listing them as General, Restricted or Revoked.
p5 (access) General service providers with access to a MyHR can access all of the MyHR’s records marked as ‘general’.
p6 (control) General service providers can also upload records to the MyHR. Records will be marked as ‘general’.
p7 (access) Restricted service providers with access to a MyHR can access all of the MyHR’s records marked as ‘general’ and
‘restricted’.
p7.i (access) Restricted access permissions is a subset of General access permissions.
p8 (control) Restricted service providers can also upload records to the MyHR. Records will be marked as ‘restricted’.
p9 (access) Revoked service providers with access to a MyHR cannot access any record.
p10 (control) Consumers can add or delete nominated representatives to their MyHR.
p11 (control) Consumers can restrict access of nominated representatives by listing them as i.e. General, Restricted or Full
access.
p12 (access) General nominated representatives can access all records of the MyHR marked as ‘general’.
p13 (access) Restricted nominated representatives can access all records of the MyHR marked as ‘general’ and ‘restricted’.
p13.i (access) Restricted access permissions is a subset of General access permissions.
p14 (access) Full access nominated representatives can access all records of the MyHR marked as ‘general’ and ‘restricted’.
p15 (control) Full access nominated representative can also upload records to the MyHR. Records will be marked as either
‘general’ or ‘restricted’.
p16 (control) Authorised representatives have full access and control over a MyHR as if they were the owner. Once a MyHR has
at least one authorised representative, the owner of such MyHR loses all control over it.
TABLE I: Control access properties of MyHR
MyHR of that person is necessary to lessen or prevent a serious
threat to public health or safety6.
IV. FORMAL MODEL IN EVENT-B
My Health Record system is composed of different elements
that interact to each other. The model in Event-B introduces
each element gradually in different machines (refinements).
The abstract model contains a series of records marked as
‘general’, ‘restricted’ or ‘hidden’. The abstract model also
defines consumers and the access to records, as well as the
mechanisms for consumers to control the access. Finally, this
machine introduces the system operators. The first refinement
introduces service providers and their access to records. It
also provides mechanisms for consumers to restrict service
providers’ access. The second refinement introduces nomi-
nated representatives and the access mechanisms of nominated
representatives to records. The final refinement introduces
authorised representatives and how they control MyHR. Once a
MyHR has an authorised representative, they act as owners of
the system and the actual owner loses all control over the
MyHR. Event-B models typically start with a very abstract
machine and each refinement adds just as much information
about the system. Due to space, the model present in this paper
shows a more compact version of the original model (fewer
refinements, but the same information). Both Event-B models
(all POs discharged) can be found in [15]. Table II shows a
description of each refinement. A more detailed description
can be found in the coming subsections.
A. My Health Record system (abstract machine)
The abstract model defines the fundamental elements of the
system:
• consumers. Healthcare recipients of the system;
6‘break glass’ functionality is not modelled.
Machine Summary
Abstract
(section IV-A)
Health record, consumers, records and their cate-
gories: ‘general’, ‘restricted’ and ‘hidden’.
Refinement 1
(section IV-B)
Service Providers, their categories and their level of
access to MyHR and records
Refinement 2
(section IV-C)
Nominated Representatives, their categories and their
level of access to MyHR and records
Refinement 3
(section IV-D)
Authorised Representative and their level of access
to MyHR and records
TABLE II: Refinement strategy summary
• records. Consumers’ medical information. They can be
categorised as ‘general’, ‘restricted’ or ‘hidden’; and
• My Health Record online space. It is owned by a con-
sumer and it contains records.
The context of the model defines a new data type: PEOPLE,
modelling potential users of the system, as well as poten-
tial system operators. Data type MY HEALTH RECORD
models all possible My Health Record of the system. And
data type RESOURCES models the possible records of the
system. The machine defines variable my health record DB
⊆ MY HEALTH RECORD, the set of all MyHR currently
active. Variable consumer ⊆ PEOPLE defines the set of
all users of the system. Variable MyHR ∈ consumer 
my health record DB maps consumers to their MyHR. It is
defined as a bijective function as by definition a consumer
owns exactly one MyHR, and each MyHR is owned by ex-
actly one consumer. Variable system operator defines the set
of people (no consumers) that serve as system operators:
system operator ⊆ PEOPLE\consumer . Records are the re-
sources of the system containing medical information about
a user; they are the elements to be shared. A record could
be a blood test, hospital discharge summary, etc. (Our model
does not distinguish between different records.). The model
defines variable records ⊆ RESOURCES to represent the set
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of records in the system. Variables records mhr ∈ records→
my health record DB and consumer own records ∈ records
→ consumer are defined as total functions to guarantee that
every record in the system is in exactly one MyHR, and has
only one owner.
Variables general records ⊆ records , restricted records ⊆
records , hidden records ⊆ records are the set of records
marked as ‘general’, ‘restricted’ and ‘hidden’, respectively. A
record can be in only one of those categories. This fact is mod-
elled as partition(records, general records, restricted records,
hidden records) . Consumers own all records on their MyHR,
∀r 7→ c ∈consumer own records =⇒
∀mhr ∈records mhr(r) =⇒
c 7→ mhr ∈MyHR.
We modelled the property via the following invariant
consumer own records−1;records mhr =MyHR.
The model also defines events for the control of the el-
ements in the MyHR (p1 (control)). Events restrict record ,
general record and hide record give owners of the MyHR
the opportunity to control the category of each record. Event
unhide record authorises a system operator to restore records
which have been previously removed. Events delete record
and upload record allow owners of the MyHR to delete and
add records (respectively). Event view record defines the
access of a consumer c to a record r . As consumers can
access their own records marked as ‘general and ‘restricted
(p2 (access)), the event can be triggered only if the c owns r
(r 7→c ∈ records ownership) and r is not marked as ‘hidden’
(r 6∈ hidden records).
Figure 4 depicts the event for marking a record as ‘re-
stricted’ in the abstract machine. restrict record enables a
consumer c to restrict record r . The guard of the event
establishes that c must have ownership over the record (grd1).
If the event is triggered, record r is added to the list of records
marked as ‘restricted’ (act1), and taken out from the list of
general records (act2).
restrict record , ANY r c
WHERE
grd1: r7→c ∈ records ownership
THEN
act1: restricted records := restricted records ∪ {r}
act2: general records := general records \ {r}
END
Fig. 4: Event for marking a record as ‘restricted’.
B. Service Providers (refinement 1)
This model (which is a refinement to the model de-
scribed in section IV-A) introduces service providers and
their access to records in MyHR. The model defines a new
data type SERVICE PROVIDERS modelling potential regis-
tered service providers. Variable service providers ⊆ SER-
VICE PROVIDERS defines the set of registered service
providers in the system. Variable consumer sp ∈ consumer
↔ service providers maps consumers to service providers.
It is defined as a relation to ensure that a service provider
can be in charge of several consumers’ healthcare and a
consumer can be associated with several service providers.
Once a service provider is managing a consumer’s health
care, such service provider has access (limited by the con-
sumer’s will) to the consumer’s MyHR (p3 (access)). This
is captured by variable sp MyHR access ∈ service providers
↔ my health record DB that maps services providers to My
Health Records, and predicate
∀c 7→ sp ∈ consumer sp =⇒
sp 7→MyHR(c) ∈ access sp mhr,
that is expressed in the model as the following invariant
access sp mhr = consumer sp−1;MyHR.
Variables general sp list , restricted sp list and
revoked sp list in the model map service providers to
MyHR (service providers ↔ my health record DB ). These
variables modelled the General, Restricted and Revoked lists,
respectively. By default, service providers are in the General
list. A service provider can be in only one of the lists, this
is modelled as partition(sp MyHR access, general sp list,
restricted sp list, revoked sp list) .
Variables general sp access ∈ service providers↔ records
and restricted sp access ∈ service providers↔ records model
the level of access of service providers to records in MyHR.
Service providers in General lists can access only records
marked as ‘general’ (p5 (access)),
∀sp 7→ r ∈ general sp access =⇒ r ∈ general records∧
sp 7→ records mhr(r) ∈ general sp list.
We express the property as the following invariant (notice
that the access is not defined for service providers in the
Revoked list (p9 (access)))
general sp access =
general sp list;(general records C records mhr)−1.
Service providers in Restricted lists can access records
marked as both ‘general’ and ‘restricted’ (p7 (access)),
∀sp 7→ r ∈ restricted sp access =⇒
r ∈ general records ∪ restricted records∧
sp 7→ records mhr(r) ∈ general sp list
∪ restricted sp list.
We express the property as the following invariant (notice
that the access is not defined for service providers in the
Revoked list (p9 (access)))
restricted sp access =(restricted sp list;
((general records∪ restricted records)Crecords mhr)−1)
∪
(general sp list;(general recordsC records mhr)−1)
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To ensure that service providers with restricted permissions
have also general permissions (p7.i (access)),
∀sp 7→ mhr ∈ general sp list =⇒
sp 7→ mhr ∈ restricted sp list,
we added the following invariant
general sp access ⊆ restricted sp access.
The model extends the events from the refined machine
for the control of the elements in the MyHR to update the
new variables. New control events are introduced to enable
consumers to assign service providers to General, Restricted
and Revoked lists (p4 (control)). revoke access sp in Figure
5 shows the event for a consumer c to revoke the access of
service provider sp to MyHR mhr . The guards of the event
establish that c owns MyHR mhr (grd1 r1), sp is in charge of
c’s healthcare (grd2 r1), and sp is not already in the Revoked
list for that MyHR (grd3 r1). If the event is triggered, the
service provider sp is added to the Revoked list (act1 r1)
and removed from the General or Restricted list (act2 r1 and
act3 r1). Access permissions for sp to mhr are also updated:
sp cannot access any records in mhr (act4 r1 and act5 r1).
revoke access sp , ANY sp mhr c
WHERE
grd1 r1: c 7→ mhr ∈MyHR
grd2 r1: c 7→ sp ∈ consumer sp
grd3 r1: sp 7→MyHR(c) 6∈ revoked sp list
THEN
act1 r1 : revoked sp list := revoked sp list ∪ {sp 7→ mhr}
act2 r1 : restricted sp list := restricted sp list \ {sp 7→mhr}
act3 r1 : general sp list := general sp list \ {sp7→mhr}
act4 r1 : general sp access := general sp access
\ ( ({sp}C general sp access)B records mhr−1[{mhr}])
act5 r1 : restricted sp access := restricted sp access
\ ( ({sp}C restricted sp access)B records mhr−1[{mhr}])
END
Fig. 5: Event for revoking access to a service provider.
The model also introduces new events for the access to
records. Event view record service provider enables a ser-
vice provider to access a record. The event makes sure
that the corresponding properties are not violating (e.g. a
service provider in the General list can only access records
marked as ‘general’). Events upload general record SP and
upload restricted record SP enable service provider to upload
general and restricted records, respectively, if they are allowed
to do so (p6 (control) and (p8 (control))).
C. Nominated Representatives (refinement 2)
This model (which is a refinement of the model in sec-
tion IV-B) introduces nominated representatives and their
access permissions on records. The model defines variables
general nominated ∈ consumer↔ my health record DB , re-
stricted nominated ∈ consumer↔ my health record DB and
full access nominated ∈ consumer ↔ my health record DB
to represent the lists of General, Restricted and Full ac-
cess nominated representatives. Invariant general nominated
∩ restricted nominated = ∅ ensures that a nominated repre-
sentative is in either list (Full Access nominated are special
Restricted nominated). Consumers cannot be nominated rep-
resentatives of their own MyHR,
∀nr 7→ mhr ∈ general nominated
∪ restricted nominated =⇒
nr 7→ mhr 6∈MyHR.
We express the property as
(general nominated ∪ restricted nominated) ∩ MyHR = ∅.
Variables general nominated access ∈ consumer↔ records
and restricted nominated access ∈ consumer ↔ records
model the level of access of nominated representatives to
records in MyHR. General nominated representative can access
only records marked as ‘general’ (p12 (access)),
∀nr 7→ r ∈ general nominated access =⇒
r ∈ general records∧
nr 7→ records mhr(r) ∈ general nominated.
We express the property as
general nominated access =
general nominated;(general records C records mhr)−1.
Whereas Restricted nominated representatives can access
records marked as both ‘general’ and ‘restricted’ (p13 (ac-
cess)),
∀sp 7→ r ∈ restricted sp access =⇒
r ∈ general records ∪ restricted records∧
sp 7→ records mhr(r) ∈ general sp list
∪ restricted sp list.
We express the property as
restricted nominated access =(restricted nominated;
((general records∪ restricted records)Crecords mhr)−1)
∪
(general nominated;(general recordsC records mhr)−1)
Full access representatives have the same access permis-
sions as Restricted representatives (p14 (access)),
∀nr 7→ mhr ∈ full access nominated =⇒
nr 7→ mhr ∈ restricted nominated.
We express the property as
full access nominated ⊆ restricted nominated access.
To ensure that nominated representatives with Restricted
level access have also General level access (p13.i (access)),
∀nr 7→ r ∈ general nominated access =⇒
nr 7→ r ∈ restricted nominated access,
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we added the following property
general nominated access ⊆ restricted nominated access.
The model extends the events from the refined machine
for the control of the elements in the MyHR to update the
new variables. New events are introduced to enable users
(owners) to add and delete nominated representatives (p10
(control)), as well as to control their level of access. Con-
sumers are enabled to assign nominated representatives to
General, Restricted or Full access (p11 (control)). Full access
nominated can also upload records to MyHR. The model
introduces events upload general record nominated and up-
load restricted record nominated that enable Full access rep-
resentatives to upload records marked as ‘general’ or ‘re-
stricted’ (p15 (control)).
Event grant full access to nominated in Figure 6 shows
the event for a consumer c to grant Full access permissions
to nominated representative n in MyHR mhr . The guards of the
event establish that the consumer c is not nominating them-
selves as representative nominated (grd1 r2), as the owner of
the MyHR cannot be a representative of it; c owns MyHR mhr
(grd2 r2); and that n is not already a representative nominated
of MyHR (grd3 r2, grd4 r2 and grd5 r2). If the event is
triggered, the nominated representative is added to both lists
restricted nominated and full access nominated (act1 r2 and
act2 r2). As Full access nominated representatives are a
special type of Restricted ones, access permissions of n in
mhr are also updated (act3 r2): n has access to all records in
mhr that are marked as ‘general’ and ‘restricted’.
grant full access to nominated , ANY n mhr c
WHERE
grd1 r2: c 6= n
grd2 r2: c7→mhr ∈MyHR
grd3 r2: n 7→mhr 6∈ general nominated
grd4 r2: n 7→mhr 6∈ restricted nominated
grd5 r2: n 7→mhr 6∈ full access nominated
THEN
act1 r2: restricted nominated := restricted nominated ∪ {n 7→mhr}
act2 r2: full access nominated := full access nominated ∪ {n7→mhr}
act3 r2: restricted nominated access := restricted nominated access ∪
({n}×dom((general records∪restricted records)C(records mhrB{mhr})))
END
Fig. 6: Event for granting full access to a nominated.
The model also introduces new events for the access to
records. view record nominated enables a nominated repre-
sentative to access a record. The event makes sure that the
corresponding properties are not violating (e.g. a nominated
representation in the Restricted list can access records marked
as ‘general’ and ‘restricted’).
D. Authorised Representatives (refinement 3)
This model (which is a refinement of the model in section
IV-C) introduces authorised representatives and their access
and control permissions on records and MyHR. Authorised
representatives act as owners of the MyHR. The model defines
variable authorised rep ∈ consumer↔my health record DB
that maps consumers with authorised privileges to MyHR.
Consumers cannot be authorised representatives of their own
MyHR,
∀c 7→ mhr ∈ authorised rep =⇒ c 7→ mhr 6∈MyHR.
We express the property as
authorised rep ∩ MyHR = ∅.
If a MyHR has an authorised representative, the owner
loses all control of the system, and the authorised repre-
sentatives take over. The model captures this by adding a
guard to each event that an owner can perform ensuring
that such MyHR does not have any authorised represen-
tative (p16 (control)). As an example, guards for events
restrict record (in Figure 4), revoke access sp (in Figure
5), and grant full access to nominated (in Figure 6) are
extended to hold also the following guard MyHR(c) 6∈
ran(authorised rep) : the owner of the MyHR can perform
these actions only if the MyHR does not have an authorised
representative.
E. Correctness of the model
We have proved the soundness of the model by dis-
charging all proof obligations (POs) generated by Rodin.
The model is composed of an abstract machine and 3 re-
finements. Our modelling resulted in 525 proof obligations,
where about 77% (406) were discharged automatically using
Rodin’s built-in provers. This high percentage of automa-
tion depends on the modelling style applied. For example,
we added some redundant information (as variables in the
model) to help provers in the verification process. For in-
stance, variable sp MyHR access , in the first refinement,
maps service providers to MyHR that they have access to.
However, this information can be inferred from variables
mapping service providers to records (general sp access and
restricted sp access) – as records, by definition, belong to
only one MyHR. The decision of adding this redundant infor-
mation is that the model is self-explained and proof obligations
are easier to discharge.
We have proved all properties described in Table I (and
depicted in figures 2 and 3). That is to say, we have proved
that the model lets:
• consumers have access and control over records (they can
decide to mark them as ‘general’, ‘restricted’ or ‘hidden’);
• consumers have control over service providers. Con-
sumers can list them as General, Restricted or Revoked;
• consumers have also control over nominated representa-
tives. Consumers can add and delete, and list them as
General, Restricted or Full access;
• authorised representatives to take full control of the
MyHR;
• nominate representatives with Full access to upload
records marked as ‘general’ or ‘restricted’;
• nominated representatives with Full access and Restricted
permissions to access records marked as ‘general’ and
‘restricted’;
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• nominated representatives with General permissions to
access only records marked as ‘general’;
• service providers in the General list upload records
marked as ‘general’, and access only records marked as
‘general’;
• service providers in the Restricted list upload records
marked as ‘restricted’, and access records marked as both
‘general’ and ‘restricted’;
The correctness of a system not only depends on its verifi-
cation (i.e. have we modelled the system right?), but also on
its validation (i.e. have we modelled the right system?). As
a validation step, we used two plug-ins of Rodin: ProB, to
translate the model to B; and EventB2Java, to generate JML-
annotated Java code from the model. ProB can be used as
an animator of the specification. The animation in ProB is
fully automatic. We animated our model in ProB finding no
inconsistencies; adding a level of confidence on the model. We
also used the EventB2Java tool to translate the last refinement
of the model. The Java implementation of MyHR consists of
48 Java classes. There is a Java class that implements JUnit
test cases: 30 test cases manually written that conform to the
My Health Record specification. The implementation passed
all tests. Both the ProB animation and the description of the
test cases (along with the implementation) can be found in
[15].
V. RELATED WORK
There are as many different models of online health record
systems around the world as there are healthcare systems.
There are also many different approaches implemented by
different countries that have been designed based on their
own policy frameworks. In United Kingdom, the National
Health Service implemented the Summary Care Record [1]
(SCR). A SCR is an electronic consumer record that contains
health record information. Once a consumer is registered
with a GP, then the consumer’s SCR is created automatically
(consumers can opt-out). Records in the system cannot be fully
deleted, although consumers can request for their information
to be withheld from the system once opted out. SCRs can
be accessed by service providers’ stuff (as long as they are
in charge of the consumer’s healthcare and they access the
information through a secure system). In Austria, ELGA [2],
[16] (elektronische Gesundheitsakte) is an information system
that provides consumers and their healthcare entities with an
access to their health records. Health records are created at
various health facilities. ELGA networks the data and makes
it available electronically. The system is available to everyone
who is covered by the Austrian health care system, and it
enables consumers to opt out. In Singapore, the National Elec-
tronic Health Record [3] (NEHR) is a secure online system that
collects summary of consumers health records across different
service provider providers. This enables authorised healthcare
professionals to have a holistic picture of your healthcare
history.
These systems have similarities to MyHR. The key feature of
MyHR, and difference w.r.t. to other systems, is that consumers
have access to and can fully control what is stored on their
systems. They can also decide which service providers and
nominated representatives can access which records. A similar
system is the one developed in Estonia. The Electronic Health
Record system [17] (e-Health Record) creates a common
record every consumer can access online. Every Estonian is
automatically included in the system from birth, and they are
enabled to opt out at any time. In e-Health Record, consumers
can restrict records from service providers, they can also grant
access to other consumers (i.e. nominated representatives).
Unlike MyHR, consumers cannot delete any records nor upload
information (e.g. blood sugar values). Furthermore, no formal
specification and verification has been performed on these
systems.
Our work closely follows Role Based Access control [18],
[19] (RBAC), which is a classic access model that uses the
notion of users, roles and defines the privileges between those
notions. Users (e.g. service providers) might have specific
roles (e.g. General access) that define how to access resources
(e.g. general service providers can only access records marked
as ‘general’). Formalisation of RBAC has been done in Z
[20] and in B [21]. We inspired our work on these works,
although, the work present in this paper is shaped by a specific
domain following specific policy frameworks. SGAC [22] is
a healthcare access control model that manages the access
to consumers’ records. The model has been formally verified
with Alloy [23] and ProB [11]. Our work is similar to SGAC
as it is the specification and verification of a health record
system. However, the target specification language is different:
we used Event-B and the associated tools for verification and
code generation. Furthermore, unlike SGAC, the specification
present in this paper is not the specification of an ideal
system rather a realistic one. We present a specification that
closely follows the legislative framework that defines the
system, without making any assumption. As a future work,
we plan to incorporate some of the SGAC features, e.g.
more fine grained access to records and conflict resolution,
as these enhance MyHR. eXtensible Access Control Markup
[24] (XACML) is an attribute-based access control standard.
It evaluates access requests according to rules. A rule has a
subject (e.g. a service provider), an action (e.g. access), a
resource (e.g. a record), and a effect (permit or deny). The
standard has been formalised in CSP [25] and VDM [26].
XACML can be used for MyHR, but the standard does not
natively support inheritance of permissions (e.g. Restricted
permissions inherit General permissions). Azeem et al. [27]
present a specification of an e-Health system in Z. The system
deals with the scheduling of GPs and patients. Their work has
the same spirit as the one in this paper (even though the system
is different). However, we present not just the specification, but
also the verification of the system and its validation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Electronic personal health record systems play a key role in
today’s society. The benefits are clear: avoids healthcare frag-
mentation and duplication; supports accessibility and availabil-
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ity, allowing timely and instantly access to information; im-
proves coordination and quality of service providers; improves
readability and accuracy, reducing misinterpretation; among
others. No wonder why it is one of the 14 Grand Challenges
for Engineering in the 21st Century [28]. These systems
contain sensitive and confidential health information about
consumers. As such, it is imperative to make sure that the right
mechanisms for control and access are in place. Not just to
ensure that health information is properly managed (which is
of paramount importance), but also for users to gain confidence
in the system: it would be useless if users did not trust it.
This paper presents the formal specification and verification of
the My Health Record System, the electronic personal health
record system being used in Australia. We retrieved a set of
control and access properties from the Australian legislation
that defines the system. We formally modelled the system
and its properties in Event-B and proved it correct. As a
validation step, the model was animated by translating it to
ProB. This gave us a layer of confidence in the model. We then
generated JML-annotated Java code from the Event-B model
and manually implemented JUnit test cases that conform to the
system specification. An advantage of testing the specification
is that it is done in terms of the application domain; on a
much higher abstract level. Therefore, tests are relevant, as
they exercise user needs and requirements, taking the system
as a whole.
Work in progress is aimed at (i) proposing a more fine-
grained mechanism for accessing health information, so users
are able to control not just how to disclose health information
to service providers, but also to GPs within those service
providers; (ii) opening an avenue for using formalism to
verify legislation. Formal modelling and the need to make
abstractions and refine them, help understand the system,
while finding inconsistencies in it. As future work, we plan to
formally model the Act that defines the regulations for physical
health records and formally prove the consistency between the
legislation and MyHR.
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